Enabling technologies are software, artificial intelligence (AI) or other capabilities that support existing technologies and capabilities. Challenges posed by enabling technologies and capabilities include:
- cybersecurity risks for:
- remotely piloted operations
- autonomous operations
- navigation services.
- safety assurance, including software assurance as part of aircraft certification and air navigation service design
- digitalisation in relation to the provision of operational and aircraft certification approvals
- AI and machine learning elements for autonomy
- radio frequency (RF) spectrum management issues.
Enabling technologies and capabilities can vary in how they evolve and advance. Some of these capabilities evolve and develop over time, for example, safety assurance measures.
Others may remain relatively stable but involve large implementation activities. For example, the digitisation of regulatory services.
Some are new to the safety regulatory environment. For example, cybersecurity risks, AI and machine learning.
Activity status in the immediate to near term
Collaborating with Airservices Australia, we are looking at bringing in more digital tools and solutions for the growing RPAS operations. This includes trials for airspace authorisations.
We will look at the potential of blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies for aviation applications. We will also investigate how these technologies can align with and improve record-keeping practices in line with regulatory requirements.
Those new to the RPAS design and manufacturing industry might not have a deep understanding of conventional aviation design and certification techniques. In particular for formalised system safety assessment (SSA) approaches.
To help those new to the industry, we are in the process of creating a policy on vehicle performance and reliability. We are using the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) methodology developed by Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS).
We will work towards refining and implementing formalised software assurance processes. This makes sure we identify, evaluate, and mitigate cybersecurity risks in safety-critical aviation systems.
We will focus on certification evidence based on analysis rather than from traditional ground-based or in-flight testing. This approach, often called 'virtual certification' or 'certification by analysis' could help us handle increasing needs for certification.
Activity status in the medium term
Virtual certification activities will continue into the medium term. Medium term activities will include ongoing regulatory responses to evolving enabling capabilities.
Activity status in the long term
Longer term activities will include ongoing regulatory responses to evolving enabling capabilities.