During the May 2025 SSRP workshop, aircraft operators, ground handling agencies, and aerodrome representatives highlighted challenges in standardising standard operating procedures (SOPs) across the sector. Ground handlers often must follow different procedures for the same equipment depending on the operator, leading to inefficiencies and potential safety risks.
Concerns raised included:
- Non-compliant airside driving
- Use of mobile phones while working or transiting airside
- Ground staff not paying attention to aircraft movements or running engine proximity
- Incorrect handling or placement of cones and chocks
- Staff shortages or inexperience due to high workforce turnover.
With the transient nature of ground handlers, the workshop also discussed the possibility of minimum or below staffing numbers reducing the standard expected.
What can operators do?
The group emphasised the critical importance of having consistent procedures across operations. This is particularly important given the shared use of resources such as Ground Handling Agencies and Ground Service Equipment (GSE). Operators agreed that, where possible, there are clear advantages to developing common Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for ground handling activities. One operator has already initiated a review process to identify procedural variations and decide the most suitable areas for standardisation.
The group encouraged aircraft operators to work with Ground Handling Agencies, aerodromes, and other operators to raise and resolve any concerns about conflicting SOPs.
As outlined in the Ground Service Equipment Issues section, organisations should apply their Safety Management System (SMS) processes to manage these risks effectively. A robust SMS allows for the monitoring and assessment of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), which support the consistent use and continuous improvement of SOPs.
To mitigate the risks of uncontrolled or ad hoc changes, it is essential to manage change in a structured and systematic way. Organisations must evaluate changes both in their internal operations and in the broader operating environment to identify hazards and risks that could affect safety.
While operational flexibility and business responsiveness are important, operators must make changes with safety as the main focus. Even changes designed to improve safety may introduce unintended consequences or new risks elsewhere in the system. This reinforces the need for robust change management processes in the SMS framework.
SMS-based change management should include hazard identification and risk assessment directly related to the safety of operations. External pressures – such as challenges in maintaining sustainable business growth – can influence safety outcomes. Operators should consider them in broader operational risk assessments. This is true even if they may fall outside the formal scope of SMS.
Organisations are often already aware of key risks in their operations. These can include risks like fatigue risk from long commutes or areas where maintenance activities present higher levels of exposure. In such cases, organisations should use existing knowledge to verify that appropriate control measures are in place and effective.
Once organisations recognise hazards and associated risks, they should review the defences and controls currently in place and determine whether they need additional mitigations.
An important, yet often variable, element of an SMS is providing for confidential reporting. Confidential reporting is vital for supporting an open reporting culture, where staff feel safe to report safety concerns without fear of personal consequences. In smaller organisations, where anonymity can be challenging due to close working relationships, this requires extra care and trust-building.
Through a confidential hazard or safety reporting system, organisations can uncover latent conditions or emerging issues that may affect aviation safety. Reporting may be reactive (following an event) or proactive (to prevent potential issues before they occur).
Complementing SMS processes, Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) offer a proactive, voluntary, and non-punitive means for assessing operational safety margins. LOSA involves trained observers, typically peers, who observe standard flight operations to gather data on threat management, crew performance, and error handling. They do this in a Threat and Error Management (TEM) framework. This serves as an extra assurance mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness and real-world use of SOPs.
What is CASA doing or has already delivered?
We encourage and support ongoing communication between operators ground handling agencies and aerodromes to improve operating procedures and increase the safety benefits to aviation.
We have and will continue discussions with industry to promote the results of:
- effective safety management systems
- best practice
- regulatory requirements.
Strategic committees like Ground Operations Safety Advisory Forum (GO-SAFE) give guidance on regulations and safety management systems and share safety data with the industry.